Nuclear Fuel as Critical Infrastructure: Slovakia Is Building Supply Chain Sovereignty
On 9 April 2026, Slovenské elektrárne, the Czech ČEZ, the Finnish Fortum and the Hungarian MVM Paks NPP signed a contract with the company Framatome for the development of the VERA-440 fuel assembly, which is a 100 % European fuel for VVER-440 reactors. The total value of the project reaches approximately 50 million euros, of which 10 million comes from the EU SAVE programme (Safe and Alternative VVER European) with 17 partners from 7 Member States and Ukraine. The commercial deployment of a sovereign European fuel is expected after 2035. This is not just an energy story. It is an event in the field of critical infrastructure security.
Why Nuclear Fuel Is a Question of Critical Infrastructure
Nuclear power covers 62 to 66 % of electricity generation in Slovakia. Any disruption of fuel supplies would be felt in a cascading manner across all sectors of critical infrastructure, from energy through transport and healthcare to digital infrastructure and public administration. This is precisely the logic of cascading failures that is anchored in Act No. 367/2024 Coll. on Critical Infrastructure.
The Act entered into force on 1 January 2025 and transposes the EU CER Directive (2022/2557). It explicitly requires the identification of critical entities by 17 July 2026, the assessment of resilience and the management of supply chain security. In parallel, Act No. 366/2024 Coll., which transposes NIS 2, imposes on entities providing critically important services the obligation to manage third-party risks and direct responsibility of management for cybersecurity. The supply of nuclear fuel falls under both legal frameworks. Non-compliance can mean a fine of up to 10 million euros or 2 % of global turnover.
A three-track diversification strategy
Slovenské elektrárne is applying a systematic risk management approach across the entire fuel cycle.
The first track is formed by the existing contract with TVEL, that is, with the Russian supplier. It is valid until 2030, with the option having been exercised in 2024. Fuel reserves cover approximately three years of operation, and Russian fuel remains the transitional foundation in the shift to alternatives.
The second track is represented by the American company Westinghouse. The long-term contract was signed in August 2023. The NOVA E-6 fuel is manufactured in Swedish Västerås, the licensing for Mochovce is under way and is to be completed in 2026 to 2027. The first deliveries are planned for 2028.
The third track, Framatome, is two-tiered. In the short-term horizon, this will involve supplies of proven-design fuel from 2027. In the long-term horizon, the goal is precisely VERA-440, that is, a sovereign European design with commercial deployment after 2035.
Diversification, moreover, does not cover only the production of fuel assemblies. Through contracts with Urenco (enrichment, a ten-year contract running into the mid-2030s, signed in July 2025) and Cameco (UF6 conversion until 2036, with deliveries starting in 2028), it covers the entire chain from ore to reactor.
The European dimension and structural vulnerability
In the European Union, five Member States operate 15 VVER-440 reactors, all historically dependent exclusively on the Russian supplier TVEL. Imports of Russian nuclear fuel into the EU rose from 239 million euros in 2021 to more than 700 million euros in 2024. Dependence on Russian enrichment fell from 38 % in 2023 to 23 % in 2024, which is evidence of real progress. Structural vulnerability, however, persists. Russia continues to control approximately 43 % of global uranium enrichment capacity, and the build-up of new capacities in the West will require another five to seven years and investments on the order of tens of billions of euros.
As GLOBSEC analysis points out, the energy sector is among the six key areas of hybrid vulnerability of Slovakia. The weaponisation of the supply chain is not a hypothetical scenario, it is a proven method of strategic pressure, which we analysed in greater detail in our article on the strategy of the United States and China. Four countries at one table at the signing of VERA-440 represent precisely that model of cross-border cooperation in the field of critical infrastructure that is recommended by the CER Directive: collective resilience instead of isolated dependence.
From legislation to practice
The government-approved Resilience Strategy for Critical Entities of the SR of 9 January 2026 and the National Cybersecurity Strategy 2026 to 2030, to whose formation AKI SR contributed dozens of expert inputs, together create the legislative framework into which the diversification of nuclear fuel directly fits.
The case study of Slovenské elektrárne illustrates the shift that Act No. 367/2024 Coll. requires of all critical entities: from formal documentation towards the demonstrable functionality of security measures. The three-track diversification is not merely a commercial strategy. It is the fulfilment of critical infrastructure resilience requirements in practice.
The leading representatives of SE name these connections openly. Branislav Strýček, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Slovenské elektrárne, stated at the press conference on 9 April: “This is probably the most important step we are taking towards independence in the development and production of fuel assemblies for our nuclear power plants. This is a purely European matter, where Russia will no longer have any say.”
The deadlines are concrete: test fuel assemblies in a reactor in Finland in 2029 and commercial deployment after 2035. The path to energy sovereignty is a long one, but today it has a contract, financing and four countries at a common table.
“The diversification of nuclear fuel supplies is a textbook example of why the Act on Critical Infrastructure places emphasis on supply chain security. Nuclear power is not just a question of kilowatt-hours, it is a question of state sovereignty and resilience.” Ing. Tibor Straka, President of AKI SR
