American Strategy in Competition with China: Proxy Conflicts as a Tool for Eliminating Chinese Critical Infrastructure

The administration of President Donald Trump, although it achieved a temporary trade truce with China following the Pusan summit in October 2025, continues its containment strategy. This strategy has long surpassed tariffs and export controls on chips or critical minerals. Recent US moves — support for Ukraine against Russia, direct military involvement in the conflict with Iran, and operations in Venezuela — can be seen as targeted strikes against key pillars of Chinese infrastructure: energy security, supply chains, and projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These actions disrupt Chinese oil imports, logistics, and investments in strategic regions, through which Washington is indirectly eliminating or seriously weakening the infrastructure on which Chinese economic and military power rests.

Direct Context of US-China Competition

Under Trump 2.0, the US has shifted emphasis from ideological confrontation to pragmatic control of resources and technologies. While direct measures (export controls on advanced semiconductors, diversification of critical raw material supplies away from China, friendshoring) are slowing Chinese progress in AI, quantum technologies, and green energy, indirect instruments operating through regional conflicts act faster and less visibly. The goal is to force China into higher energy costs, disrupt its global supply chains, and weaken its influence in Eurasia, the Middle East, and Latin America. As a result, China — the world's largest oil importer — faces supply shocks in 2026 that directly threaten its critical infrastructure.

Russia's War with Ukraine: Destabilization of Eurasian BRI Corridors

US support for Ukraine since 2022 (and its continuation into 2026 with advanced weapons and intelligence data) is not merely a defense of European security. From China's perspective, it represents the weakening of a key strategic partner — Russia — and the disruption of potential overland BRI corridors across Eurasia. The conflict causes chronic instability in the Black Sea, raises global energy and food prices, and complicates Chinese investments in infrastructure (railways, ports, energy projects). Although China benefits in the short term from cheap Russian oil, it is ultimately forced to diversify toward more expensive maritime routes, which are vulnerable to American naval dominance. The Ukrainian conflict thus indirectly eliminates China's plans for secure overland connectivity and forces Beijing to spend billions on alternatives.

The Israel–US War with Iran: A Direct Strike on China's Oil Lifeline

The most striking example in recent months is the coordinated US and Israeli strikes on Iran beginning February 28, 2026. The goal is not only to prevent Iran's nuclear program, but also to "destroy" its missile and naval capabilities. The result? A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz (through which one fifth of the world's oil passes) and a sharp decline in Iranian deliveries to China — in 2025, this amounted to more than 520 million barrels, representing a significant share of Chinese imports. Chinese refineries (particularly the so-called "teapot" refineries) must rapidly switch to more expensive alternatives, oil prices have risen by tens of percent, and China is forced to draw on its strategic reserves. This conflict directly eliminates China's energy infrastructure by disrupting its supply diversification outside of Russia, and forces Beijing into greater dependence on American-controlled or American-influenced sources. In addition, BRI projects in the Middle East (ports, pipelines) are also under threat.

US Operations Against Venezuela: Destruction of a Latin American Source of Cheap Oil

In January 2026, American intervention in Venezuela (including the capture of President Maduro) and subsequent sanctions clearly target the disruption of China's economic ties. Venezuela had been a key supplier of discounted oil to China and the site of billions of dollars in investments in extraction infrastructure (CNPC joint ventures with PDVSA). The US explicitly demanded that Caracas sever ties with China, Russia, and Iran. The result: China loses hundreds of thousands of barrels per day of cheap oil, and Chinese loans and investments worth billions of dollars are at risk. This move completes the encirclement of China's energy infrastructure — from the Middle East through Eurasia to Latin America — and forces Beijing to pay higher prices for alternatives.

Implications for the Critical Infrastructure of the Slovak Republic

These American moves are not isolated — they form a coherent strategy that indirectly threatens European (and Slovak) energy security as well. Higher oil and gas prices, disrupted global supply chains, and the risk of escalation in the Strait of Hormuz or the Black Sea could lead to energy supply disruptions, rising inflation, and pressure on our refineries, transport sector, and industry. Slovakia, as a member state of the EU and NATO, cannot ignore the fact that Chinese infrastructure weakness translates into global volatility, from which only actors with their own resources (the US) benefit.

Recommendations for strengthening resilience:

• Accelerated diversification of energy sources (LNG terminals, nuclear energy, renewable sources outside high-risk regions).
• Strengthening strategic oil and gas reserves to a minimum of 120 days.
• Development of domestic production of critical components and raw materials in cooperation with the EU (REPowerEU, Critical Raw Materials Act).
• Monitoring of Chinese reactions (possible shift toward Russia or military escalation around Taiwan) and their secondary effects on our supply chains.
• Neutrality diplomacy in conflicts, protecting Slovak interests from escalation.
  

These trends confirm that great power competition is no longer just about technology, but about control of physical infrastructure — and Slovakia must be prepared.