Czech CIS+ Sets a New Standard for Drone Coordination

The Czech Republic has completed a step that may appear in the media as a routine software delivery, but from a national security perspective represents a fundamental change in the architecture of its airspace. Through its subsidiary UpVision, the CSG Group delivered the CIS+ system to Air Navigation Services of the Czech Republic (ŘLP ČR). Built on the MAIA platform, CIS+ creates a shared digital environment for exchanging operational information between drone service providers and conventional air traffic control. The delivery will be followed by operational rollout and certification; full deployment is expected in the second half of 2027.

The Critical Infrastructure Association of the Slovak Republic considers it essential to understand that the value of this contract does not lie in the fact that Czechia will have “another information system.” What matters is that Czechia has stopped treating drones as a separate issue and has incorporated them into a shared operational picture alongside piloted aviation. That is the difference between regulation and management. And that difference should serve as a point of reference for Slovakia - not merely as something to admire.

What CIS+ Actually Changes

The system acts as a Common Information Service Provider (CISP) within the European U-space concept. It collects and distributes information about geographical zones and restrictions, shares approved flight clearances, enables the real-time identification and tracking of drones, provides data on deviations from approved flight plans, and distributes meteorological data from ŘLP operational systems. Crucially, it connects directly to the existing ATM system, allowing operational and meteorological data to be transferred automatically into the U-space environment, without phone calls or emails.

The practical impact is most apparent in exceptional situations. If ŘLP declares a restriction for an emergency medical flight, an air show or a visit by a head of state, CIS+ automatically distributes the information to all connected U-space service providers, which promptly incorporate it into their own flight planning. The process for requesting operations in areas requiring coordination with ŘLP is also digitalized: the request is submitted through the system, the decision is delivered automatically, and all affected operators receive information about approved flights in the same area. This is not simply a convenience. It reduces the risk of collision and removes the grey area in which coordination currently depends on whether people are willing and available to answer the phone.

Three Layers That Must Not Be Confused

In Slovak debate, three distinct things are repeatedly conflated, which in turn distorts investment decisions. The first is the unmanned aircraft itself as a technical device. The second is U-space: a set of rules and digital services, or the regulatory and operational environment. The third is ATM - the existing air traffic management infrastructure, with its own certification culture, safety objectives and operational continuity. CIS+ is valuable precisely because it connects these layers without merging them. Drones have not been integrated into ATM in a way that would stop ATM from being ATM. Instead, an interface has been created with its own responsibilities, data and certification regime.

This distinction also matters for defence and security. Unmanned systems are now used extensively by the armed forces, police, firefighters, emergency services and critical infrastructure operators. As deployments increase, so does the need for coordination, secure data exchange and a shared situational picture between organisations that often do not know they are operating in the same airspace at the same time. The MAIA platform also builds on insights from the European projects CERTIFLIGHT, U-Space4UAM and ATM-EXCITE. That is relevant: this is not a prototype, but a solution that has passed through research and certification environments.

Where Slovakia Stands

Slovakia has received warnings that have not yet resulted in comparable infrastructure. The Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic identified serious security risks in the process for authorising and using drones, and warned that the state lacks the tools needed to administer and manage drones in its airspace. In practice, a civic association operating an app that collected data on approximately 5,800 pilots has been filling the state’s role. Rastislav Sopko, director of the Mám dron association, estimated the drone community at approximately 30,000 pilots, with only about a third having basic information tools. For comparison, Czechia is reported to have approximately 82,000 registered drones.

These figures are not an argument against drones. They are an argument against the idea that the problem can be solved through awareness campaigns and a mobile app. Public awareness is necessary, but it is not infrastructure. As Štěpán Alexa, CEO of UpVision, put it, CIS+ gives all U-space participants one reliable, up-to-date picture of the airspace - a basic requirement for drones to fly safely and at scale.

The First Minutes Matter, Not the Sensors

The security value of a platform like this does not become apparent during a routine flight. It becomes apparent when a decision has to be made. Tibor Straka, President of the Critical Infrastructure Association of the Slovak Republic, warns: “The biggest problem may not be the drone itself, but the time available to make a decision. If we cannot quickly assess what is happening and who needs to respond, even a minor incident can have unnecessarily serious consequences.”

This idea connects civil U-space with the protection of critical infrastructure. A drone over a power plant, airport or water utility does not have to cause damage to disrupt the facility’s operations. It is enough for it to appear at the wrong time and in the wrong place while the critical entity has no idea what it is doing there. Detection is not the same as assessment, and assessment is not the same as response. CIS+ introduces the layer that addresses this gap in Czechia: not a sensor, but shared context.

The Critical Infrastructure Association of the Slovak Republic raised this issue even before the Czech delivery. In its article Not Every Drone Is an Attack. How Can You Recognise the One That Might Be? published on 7 October 2026, the association warned that a critical entity’s preparedness does not begin with purchasing sensors, but with the ability to detect an incident in time, assess it correctly and manage it without unnecessary losses. We also noted that the European framework is being developed now, and that the resulting national obligations will affect specific sites and their security management teams. Czech CIS+ provides practical confirmation of this conclusion: detection alone is not enough; shared context and time are what matter.

The European framework is also taking concrete shape. The EU Action Plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security, dated 11 February 2026, is built around four priorities - preparedness, detection capabilities, response coordination and defence preparedness and explicitly targets civil internal security and the protection of sensitive sites, including through the EASA framework and the development of U-space. The Commission has also proposed that Member States appoint national drone security coordinators. The obligations arising from this framework will affect specific sites and their security management teams, regardless of whether the state is prepared for them.

Risks That Must Not Be Overlooked

A statement that simply celebrates the Czech delivery would not be a professional one. Three risks need to be stated openly.

The first is concentration of dependency: if one platform becomes the shared information foundation for the entire ecosystem, an outage or compromise could have systemic consequences. Clear requirements for availability, separation of operational and security data, and contingency modes must therefore be built into the design.

The second is cybersecurity and supply-chain protection. Modern critical infrastructure no longer consists of isolated entities; it is an interconnected ecosystem in which energy companies depend on cloud solutions, hospitals on IT suppliers, and industrial enterprises on logistics and data services, as Tibor Straka has noted (TREND). U-space is precisely such a node.

The third is certification discipline: without certification and a verifiable operational track record, even the best-designed system remains only a promise. The Czech model is instructive precisely because it does not bypass operational rollout and certification.

Recommendations for Slovakia

Define who owns the agenda. U-space is not a Ministry of Transport project or an industry project. It is cross-sector operational infrastructure that needs a single lead body with a mandate to coordinate the transport authority, air traffic control, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, emergency services and critical infrastructure operators. Without a designated owner, individual initiatives will be duplicated and none will be integrated.

Procure an interface, not isolated applications. Slovakia should not procure another standalone tool for pilots. It should procure a layer that demonstrably connects through interfaces to ATM, U-space service providers and security services, with defined APIs and testable compliance with European requirements.

Prioritise data requirements over feature requirements. What matters is who owns the data, how long it is retained, who has access to it, and how operational telemetry is separated from security-sensitive information. These issues must be resolved in the tender specification, not added after deployment.

Connect the civil and defence dimensions from the outset. Dual-use is not a marketing term. The same airspace data is needed by civil service providers, fire brigades and power plant operators. If the defence and security branch is added only after the civil solution has been certified, two incompatible versions of the truth about the same airspace will emerge.

From the Czech Example to a Slovak Solution

The Czech CIS+ delivery is not a story about drones. It is a story about a state deciding to manage operations instead of merely tolerating them and investigating incidents after the fact. For Slovakia, this leads to an uncomfortable but useful conclusion: the greatest risk is not that drones are flying over our heads.

It is that we do not have one shared, timely picture of them. And that cannot be bought as a ready-made product. It can only be designed, certified and operated.



Sources: Defence News – Česká dodávka CIS+, AKI SR – Nie každý dron je útok, Trend – Rizikom pre kritickú infraštruktúru môžu byť aj dodávatelia, ta3 – Prečo dron nie je hračka, Noviny.sk – Kto lieta nad našimi hlavami.