The Pipeline That Determines Oil Supply
The Critical Infrastructure Association of the Slovak Republic continues its series of articles focusing on basic services under Act No. 367/2024 Coll. on Critical Infrastructure. This time, we look at a basic service that remains largely invisible to the public, yet its disruption can have an immediate impact on transport, industry and the wider economy – the operation of pipelines for the transportation of crude oil and fuels.
Where the service fits under the law
Under Annex 1 to Act No. 367/2024 Coll., this basic service falls under the Energy sector, within the Oil and oil products subsector. It covers the category of operators of pipelines for the transportation of crude oil and fuels under specific legislation, namely Act No. 251/2012 Coll. on Energy. The basic service itself is defined in the legislation as “operation of pipelines for the transportation of crude oil and fuels.” The central government authority responsible for this sector is the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic.
The Energy Act also sets out the conditions under which pipelines for the transportation of crude oil and fuels may be operated. From a critical infrastructure perspective, however, the key issue is that the assessment of a critical entity concerns not only the operation itself, but also the potential impact of a disruption of this service on society and the economy.
This service has specific names in Slovakia
The public part of the National List of Critical Entities includes TRANSPETROL, a. s., and SLOVNAFT, a. s. in relation to this basic service. Their roles in the oil supply chain are different. TRANSPETROL operates Slovakia’s oil pipeline system and provides both transit and domestic crude oil transportation. SLOVNAFT builds on this infrastructure through its refinery and product pipeline infrastructure, which is used for the transportation of fuels.
Slovakia’s oil pipeline network is approximately 500 kilometres long and is connected to international routes, including the Druzhba and Adria pipelines. These cross-border connections are one of the factors that must be taken into account when assessing the security of this basic service.
Risks associated with this service
For oil pipelines, the risks are not limited to physical damage to the pipeline itself. The key areas include:
* physical damage to pipelines, pumping stations or other technological equipment,
* disruption of supplies from a cross-border direction, even when the Slovak section of the pipeline remains undamaged,
* dependence on one or a limited number of transport routes and supply directions,
* failure of control, measurement, communication and other technological systems,
* unavailability of specialised spare parts, technologies or maintenance and service capacities,
* dependence on a limited number of suppliers of critical technologies and services,
* insufficient capacity or technical readiness of alternative routes in the event of a prolonged disruption of the main supply route,
* the accumulation of several problems, such as infrastructure damage combined with the unavailability of a technology supplier or specialised service capacity.
The risk of cross-border dependency became particularly clear in 2026. Following damage to infrastructure in Ukraine, oil supplies through the Druzhba pipeline to Slovakia and Hungary were interrupted from the end of January. Slovakia therefore had to rely on strategic reserves and seek alternative supply options. The incident demonstrated that the security of Slovakia’s basic service also depends on the condition and availability of infrastructure outside Slovakia.
Supply chains require particular attention. In the case of specialised technologies, measurement and control systems, communication components, spare parts or specialised services, the problem may not only be physical damage. Availability itself can become an issue when only a limited number of manufacturers or service providers are able to supply a particular component or service. The failure of a single supplier can therefore prolong the restoration of operations even when the pipeline infrastructure itself remains physically intact.
What AKI SR is doing in this area
AKI SR focuses in this area primarily on supply-chain risks, technological dependencies and the availability of alternatives in the event of disruption to individual links in the oil supply chain. For this basic service, it is important to connect the experience of both critical entities – TRANSPETROL as the operator of the oil pipeline system and SLOVNAFT as an entity with related product pipeline infrastructure – with that of technology suppliers and the state. AKI SR therefore focuses on identifying critical components and services that may be difficult to replace where the number of suppliers is limited, as well as on assessing realistic options for alternative routes, capacities and solutions. The objective is to ensure that, if one part of the oil supply chain is disrupted, the other potentially affected links, available alternatives and the steps required to restore operations can be identified quickly.
For this basic service, it is not enough to look only at the condition of the pipeline itself. What matters is whether the system as a whole has realistic alternatives available when one of its components stops functioning.
